Κυριακή 21 Σεπτεμβρίου 2025

Η αντιπαράθεση Τουρκίας Ισραήλ αναβαθμίζει τη συμμαχία Ελλάδας, Κύπρου, Ισραήλ και Αμερικής


ΕΠΕΙΔΗ ΓΙΝΕΤΑΙ ΜΕΓΑΛΗ ΣΥΖΗΤΗΣΗ ΓΙΑ ΤΟ ΔΗΘΕΝ ΡΑΝΤΕΒΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΕΡΝΤΟΓΑΝ ΜΕ ΤΟΝ ΤΡΑΜΠ ΣΤΙΣ 25 ΣΕΠ ΣΤΗΝ ΝΕΑ ΥΟΡΚΗ, ΟΧΙ ΓΙΑΤΙ ΤΟΝ ΚΑΛΕΣΕ Ο ΤΡΑΜΠ ΑΛΛΑ ΑΠΛΑ ΓΙΑΤΙ ΘΑ ΗΤΑΝ ΕΚΕΙ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΓΕΝΙΚΗ ΣΥΝΟΔΟ ΤΟΥ ΟΗΕ, ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΠΙΣΗΣ ΝΑ ΠΟΥΜΕ ΟΤΙ ΣΤΙΣ 23 Ο ΕΡΝΤΟΓΑΝ ΘΑ ΣΥΝΑΝΤΗΣΕΙ ΤΟΝ ΠΡΩΘΥΠΟΥΡΓΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ...ΤΑ ΥΠΟΛΟΙΠΑ ΜΠΟΡΕΙΤΕ ΝΑ ΤΑ ΔΕΙΤΕ ΣΤΑ ΒΙΝΤΕΟ... 


ΠΗΓΗ ΣΚΑΙ


ΠΗΓΗ ΝΙΚΟΣ ΛΥΓΕΡΟΣ

ΕΠΙΣΗΣ ΕΠΙΠΛΕΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΛΥΣΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΝΙΚΟΥ ΛΥΓΕΡΟΥ, ΘΑ ΠΑΡΑΘΕΣΩ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΑΝΑΛΥΣΗ ΕΝΟΣ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΥ ΚΑΘΗΓΗΤΗ ΤΟΥ Dr. Z.D. TURKER (a prolific scholar in strategic relations, bases this article on personal analysis.) O ΟΠΟΙΟΣ ΓΙΑ ΠΡΟΦΑΝΕΙΣ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ ΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙ ΣΤΟ ΝΤΟΥΜΠΑΙ - ΗΑΕ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΑΛΥΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΣΧΕΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΙΣΡΑΗΛ ΜΕ ΤΗΝ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΠΩΣ ΕΞΕΛΙΧΘΗΚΕ ΜΕ ΤΑ ΧΡΟΝΙΑ... 

The relationship between Turkey and Israel represents the story of a natural and highly strategic alliance rooted in geopolitical necessity. In 1949, Turkey became the first Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel, aligning itself with the Cold War's power dynamics and positioning itself as a pioneer in the pursuit of peace and stability in the Middle East. However, the full potential of this alliance has been undermined and even sabotaged by Turkey's misguided shifts in domestic and foreign policy. In recent years, Turkey's foreign policy has increasingly fallen under the financial influence of Qatar and the ideological manipulation of the global left, forcing Israel to seek alternative regional partners. 

This has weakened both nations' national interests. In this article, I will examine the evolution of this relationship from its "golden years" to 2025, arguing that Israel has been and remains Turkey's most natural and effective ally. Yet, due to Turkey's ideological missteps, this opportunity has been lost, compelling Israel to develop new alliances in pursuit of its own national security interests. Amid the ongoing conflicts in Gaza, Turkey's imposition of trade embargoes and airspace restrictions has plunged relations into a profound crisis.

Historical Foundations: Strategic Alignment from Early Days to the Cold War

Turkey's recognition of Israel was a product of pragmatic statecraft. On March 28, 1949, Turkey formally recognized Israel, a move that defied opposition from the Arab League and established a strategic foothold. The newly established Israeli state in 1948 served as a buffer against the rising tide of Arab nationalism, particularly the pan-Arab influence of the United Arab Republic. In the 1950s, under David Ben-Gurion's "periphery doctrine," Turkey sought alliances with non-Arab states like Israel, Iran, and Ethiopia. The Baghdad Pact (1955) further solidified this alignment, though Arab backlash and the 1967 Six-Day War introduced diplomatic tensions. Turkey cast votes against Israel at the United Nations, while domestic pro-Palestinian protests intensified. Nevertheless, these tensions were temporary, as both nations identified Syria and the Iraqi Baath regimes as common security threats.

The 1970s and 1980s grew more complex with the involvement of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel's invasion of Lebanon. The "Elrom Incident" (1971, when Israeli Consul General Ephraim Elrom was kidnapped and killed) fueled anti-Israeli sentiment in Turkey. However, following the Yom Kippur War (1973), relations evolved into discreet intelligence-sharing and electronic surveillance collaborations. This period, underpinned by Turkey's NATO membership and Israel's strategic ties with the United States, laid the groundwork for mutual dependence. As Gencer Özcan highlights in his TESEV report, the relationship was poised to transcend security, with economic and cultural ties poised to bolster the military alliance. This early synergy underscored Israel’s role as an indispensable "periphery ally" for Turkey, a potential that could have reshaped the Middle East's power balance in Turkey's favor had ideological biases been avoided.

The Golden Years: The 1990s and the Pinnacle of Strategic Partnership

The 1990s marked the zenith of Turkish-Israeli relations. The Madrid Peace Conference (1991) and Oslo Accords (1993-1995) following the Gulf War brought Ankara and Jerusalem closer. According to Jonathan Ghariani's analysis in Israel Affairs, this "golden era" saw the signing of the Military Training and Cooperation Agreement (MTCA, 1996) and a defense industry agreement (1998). Turkey secured contracts worth 1.35 billion dollars from Israel, including the modernization of 54 F-4 Phantoms for 650 million dollars and 48 F-5 aircraft for 700 million dollars. Joint exercises, such as Reliant Mermaid (1998), incorporated the United States and Jordan, enhancing the regional security architecture. Trade volume surged from 100 million dollars in 1990 to 1.5 billion dollars by 2000, with approximately 500,000 Israeli tourists visiting Turkey annually, deepening economic interdependence.

The geopolitical foundation of this partnership rested on shared threats: Syria's logistical support for the PKK in the Bekaa Valley and Iran's testing of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile in 1998. Ali Balcı and Tuncay Kardaş’s securitization framework reveals how the Turkish military positioned Israel as indispensable for safeguarding "secularism and territorial integrity" during the Refahyol coalition (1996-1997). Necmettin Erbakan’s attempt to secure a 23-billion-dollar gas deal with Iran was thwarted by military pressure, culminating in the "soft coup" of February 28, 1997, which forced his resignation. Ghariani notes that even under Erbakan, the alliance deepened—his government approved key agreements like the AEIA despite initial resistance, such as the vetoed F-16 factory visit. Intelligence cooperation, including Ofek-4 satellite imagery, bolstered Syria-targeted operations, while technologies like Python-4 air-to-air missiles and Merkava Mk3 tanks enhanced Turkey's air and ground defense capabilities.

This decade demonstrated Turkey’s potential as a stability actor in the Middle East. Israel served as a critical buffer against PKK and Hezbollah threats, with discussions on Arrow anti-ballistic missile systems addressing Iran’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ambitions. Counter-alliance efforts by Egypt and Syria (e.g., the 1997 Cairo-Damascus summit) failed, while Jordan’s observer role in exercises like Reliant Mermaid expanded the axis. The United States’ support, reflected in Nicholas Burns’ statements, aligned the partnership with NATO objectives. Ghariani argues that the 1990s marked a shift from a transient "periphery alliance" to a durable strategic partnership, showcasing the pinnacle of Turkey’s natural alignment with Israel. Balcı and Kardaş’s analysis further supports this, illustrating how the military’s "existential threat" narrative (PKK, religious extremism) integrated Israel, maximizing Turkey’s regional deterrence despite ideological hurdles.

Transformation and Collapse: The Strategic Cost of Political Missteps

The early 2000s witnessed a reversal of securitization (desecuritization), poisoning the relationship. Balcı and Kardaş argue that the rise of the AKP strengthened civilian authority, curbing the military’s influence, while the Palestinian issue was weaponized domestically. The détente following the 1998 Syria crisis (Öcalan’s extradition) unraveled with the Gaza blockade (2008-2009) and the Mavi Marmara incident (2010, killing nine Turkish activists). Özcan labels this shift "critical dialogue," while Ghariani views 2010 as the "official end." The core disruption stemmed from ideological deviations: Qatar’s 1.8 billion dollars in funding for Hamas (since 2012, with a political bureau in Doha) and the global left’s Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement radicalized Turkish foreign policy. Özcan’s report underscores how this shift undermined the "beyond security" potential, with the AKP’s Palestinian-focused rhetoric bolstering domestic coalitions at the expense of strategic depth.
These missteps drove Israel toward the Abraham Accords (2020, with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan), which proved resilient into their fifth year by 2025, despite the Gaza conflict, with potential expansion to Saudi Arabia filling Turkey’s void. The 7 October 2023 Hamas attack (killing 1,200 Israelis) triggered Erdoğan’s Qatar-aligned rhetoric, praising Hamas as "resistance fighters," plunging relations to a nadir. By 2025, trade volume dropped from 7 billion dollars to zero, with Turkey imposing an airspace and port ban on 29 August. 

Qatar’s annual 400 million dollars in Hamas support, hosting leaders like Khaled Mashal in Doha, turned Turkey into an indirect threat. The global left’s influence—evident in 2025 university protests and European leftist boycott calls—trapped Ankara in an "occupier" narrative, constraining Israel’s self-defense rights and alienating its natural ally. Ghariani’s foresight materialized: Erdoğan’s Palestinian stance dismantled the 1990s pragmatism, tethering Turkey to Qatar and pushing Israel toward Greece and Cyprus (e.g., the East Mediterranean Gas Forum).

Current Developments: Geopolitical Balances from a 2025 Perspective

As of 13 September 2025, 5:21 PM GST, the ongoing Gaza conflict has left Turkish-Israeli relations at their peak tension. Erdoğan’s UN speeches labeling Israel "genocidal" and the 10-billion-dollar gas deal with Qatar have deepened Israel’s isolation. While the trade embargo persists through indirect channels (e.g., third-country routes), Israel’s gas exports to Turkey have declined. 

The Abraham Accords’ potential expansion, spurred by Trump’s August 2025 call for a Saudi deal, underscores Turkey’s loss. Israel’s 11 September airstrike on Hamas targets in Doha (killing three leaders with 15 jets) positioned Turkey as the "next target"; experts interpret this as a warning to Erdoğan, with Trump’s "I am very unhappy" remark complicating U.S. mediation.

The global left’s manipulation was stark in the March 2025 Istanbul protests (100,000 attendees) and European boycotts, with Turkish media, fueled by Al Jazeera’s narrative, systematically targeting Israel. Israel’s axis with Cyprus, Greece, and India—expanded via the East Mediterranean Gas Forum in 2024—mitigates Turkey’s missteps. Özcan’s vision of a "beyond security" framework remains viable: 300,000 annual tourists, drone technology transfers, and cultural exchanges could transcend the Palestinian issue. If Turkey breaks free from Qatar’s grip (e.g., expelling Hamas leaders) and revives strategic dialogue, a win-win scenario could emerge. 

Yet, Qatar’s support for Hamas and Turkey’s silence compel Israel to forge new alliances, such as a potential Abraham expansion with Saudi Arabia, a rational response to national security needs.
Analytical Depth: Supporting the Core Thesis
The core thesis—that Israel is Turkey’s natural and optimal ally, undermined by Turkey’s political missteps, forcing Israel to seek new partners—rests on robust historical and contemporary evidence. 

The 1990s demonstrated a synergy where shared threats (Syria’s PKK support, Iran’s WMD programs) aligned military and economic interests. Ghariani’s data on 1 billion dollars in arms sales by 1998 and Balcı-Kardaş’s securitization model highlight how the Turkish military leveraged Israel to counter existential risks, a strategy that maximized regional influence. This period’s success—evidenced by joint operations and NATO-aligned exercises—proves Israel’s role as Turkey’s strategic anchor.

The AKP era, however, marked a departure. Özcan’s "critical dialogue" concept reflects a shift from security-driven pragmatism to ideologically charged posturing, exacerbated by Qatar’s 1.8 billion dollars to Hamas and the global left’s BDS campaigns. The 2023 Hamas attack and 2025 Gaza escalation exposed Turkey’s vulnerability: its silence on Qatar’s 400 million dollars in annual support and Erdoğan’s rhetoric alienated Israel, pushing it toward the Abraham Accords and the Cyprus-Greece-India axis. 

The 11 September Doha strike and Trump’s mediation failure underscore Israel’s need to diversify alliances, a direct consequence of Turkey’s misaligned priorities.
This shift has strategic costs. Turkey’s 29 August 2025 bans severed a 7-billion-dollar trade lifeline, while Israel’s gas forum partnerships with Greece (2024 deal worth 2 billion dollars) and India (defense pact, 2025) signal a reorientation. The global left’s influence—amplified by 100,000 protesters in Istanbul—further isolates Turkey, aligning it with Qatar’s radical agenda rather than Israel’s stabilizing role. Historically, the 1998 Syria crisis resolution via Turkish-Israeli intelligence (Ofek-4 imagery) showed what mutual cooperation could achieve; today’s discord reflects a lost opportunity. Özcan’s "beyond security" model, with its focus on tourism and technology, offers a path forward, but Turkey must prioritize national interests over ideological posturing to reclaim this alliance.

The Urgency of a Pragmatic Turn

Israel stands as Turkey’s natural and most strategic ally, a fact proven by the 1990s’ golden years, when shared threats forged a victorious partnership. Yet, ideological deviations—fueled by Qatar’s radical financing and the global left’s hypocrisy—have undermined this bond. Israel’s pursuit of new allies, from the Abraham Accords to Cyprus and India, is a rational defense of its national interests, a direct result of Turkey’s policy failures. Ankara can reverse this decline by embracing pragmatism—balancing support for Palestine with renewed cooperation with Israel. Failure to do so will erode Middle Eastern stability to both nations’ detriment. History teaches that alliances thrive on shared interests, not ideology; Turkey must heed this lesson with urgency.

Dr. Z.D. Turker, a prolific scholar in strategic relations, bases this article on personal analysis.

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